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IntroductionChapter 1
AnOverview: 1950-70
Inthis volume we propose to examine India's foreign trade regime in its inter-
action with domestic policies and objectives, so as to assess its efficiency and
growth. Earlier analyses of India's trade and industrial:ization policies have
focused largely on the criteria underlying the allocation mechanisms, both
domestic and foreign, and have examined many of the principal, static ineffi-
ciencies arising from these mechanisms.' The present study goes substantially
beyond these issues in two major respects:
1. We examine at length the efficiency and outcome of the liberalization
efforts represented by the June 1966 devaluation and the accompanying policy
measures, thus casting light on the important issues raised by attempts at
lessening the restrictive nature of the OR-regime and on the optimal methods of
effecting a transition to a less restrictive foreign trade regime; and
2. We analyze at great length several issues relating to the growth effects
of India's foreign trade regime, examining the impactsavings, innovation,
inducement to invest, and other such effects which are correctly considered to
be important in reaching an overall judgment on the desirability of the eco-
nomic policy framework.
This chapter, which constitutes Part I, contains a broad description of the
central economic and political characteristics of the Indian economy (such
as industrial licensing and targeting under successive five-year plans), and a
general review of the principal developments in economic indices (such as
GNP, price level, foreign trade and agricultural production) since 1950. We
then proceed to divide the period 1950—70, to which our analysis is confined,
into several phases as defined by Bhagwati-Krueger for the NBER project,
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whose main elements are spelled out at the beginning of this volume. Having
then defined the phases, our study proceeds in Part II to a discussion of the
"anatomy" of exchange control, concentrating on the period 1956—66. The
purpose of this analysis is to indicate the methods of allocation and interven-
tion in the foreign trade and payments sector practiced during this period by
the government, and to trace their economic impact. The analysis concentrates
here on the static efficiency effects of the foreign trade policies only in a general
way; statistical analysis of the allocation effects as well as of differential re-
turns to alternative acts of investment that follow from indiscriminate and auto-
matic protection is deferred to later treatment along with the other growth
effects of the regime. Part III presents an analysis of the period 1966—70,
focusing on the outcome of the "liberalization episode" constituted by the
June 1966 devaluation and associated policy changes. Finally, Part IV treats
the growth effects of the foreign trade regime, taking the entire 1950—70
period as its canvas, and analyzes a number of possible linkages between
India's economic performance and her foreign trade regime (taken in con-
junction, of course, with her domestic economic regime).
THE INDIAN ECONOMY SINCE 1950
India became independent in 1947. By 1950, the country had formally initi-
ated efforts at planning for accelerated growth consistent with the objective
of social justice. This implied that a succession of five-year plans was to define
the overall contours within which economic and social efforts were to be under-
taken. The First Plan was to run from 1951 to 1956, with others following in
continuous succession until athree-yearinterruption prior to the Fourth
Plan.
The First Plan was essentially put together around a Harrod-Domar
model. The emphasis of this approach, as is now well understood, is on flow
analysis and the Plan therefore focused on fiscal policy aimed at raising
domestic savings to the degree required by the projected investment levels
that result from planned income expansion and the estimated marginal capital-
output ratio. At the same time, the main thrust of the Plan was to build infra-
structure. But the Second Plan (1956—6 1) was conceived around a structural
model of the Feidman-Mahalanobis variety and this led to an emphasis on
determining and controlling the pattern of investments, thus greatly reinforcing
the tendency later imparted by the foreign exchange crisis that began with
an overexpansion of investment in the first year of the Second Plan.2 Thus
the Second Plan witnessed the initiation and subsequent intensification of two
basic pillars of policy that were strongly to influence the economic efficiency
of the regime: (1) industrial targeting and licensing and (2) exchange controlAN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 5
over all current transactions, resulting in the licensing of imports of capital
goods, intermediates and consumer goods.
Indeed, in the analysis presented in this volume we will find that the inter-
action of these two licensing measures compounded disproportionately the in-
efficiencies that would have followed from the operation of either by itself,
thus illustrating the point that it is not possible to analyze the effects of the
foreign trade regime without taking fully into account the institutional mecha-
nism at the domestic level as well. This emphasis on industrial and import
licensing was to continue through the decade of 1956—66. Efforts to reduce its
impact were undertaken through the early 1960s, and they were to culminate
in the devaluation of June 1966 and in the associated policy changes that
aimed at liberalizing the foreign trade regime. In view of their critical im-
portance in assessing the efficiency of the foreign trade regime, the main fea-
tures of the industrial licensing mechanism will be described in some detail
below.
We should also note here, for later amplification, the importance of several
other institutional features of the Indian economy: (1) a significant growth of
public sector investment in areas outside of infrastructure; (2) a (less) signifi-
cant growth of Indian trade with the Soviet bloc under bilateral agreements;
(3) an increasing canalization of profitable imports, and partial handling-cum-
subsidization of exports, by the government-owned State Trading Corporation;
(4) a strict (ex ante) regulation, on a case-by-case basis, of the inflow of private
foreign capital and technology into the economy; and (5) in contrast to many
LDCs, the availability of an efficient administrative service, entrepreneurial
talent and educated, skilled personnel for manning the projected investments.
Before discussing these institutional features in detail, we review some of the
major features of India's economic performance since 1950.
Basic Indices.
NATIONAL INCOME
According to the data on net national product presented in Table 1—1, the
Indian economy seems to have grown, in real terms, at 3.5 to 4 percent per
annum on the average during the first decade of planning, from 1950—5 1 to
1960—6 1, and then experienced a decline during the Third Five-Year Plan to
an average rate of growth of about 2.5 percent. It is important to note that the
end of the Third Five-Year Plan was attended by serious drought which led to
an unprecedented decline in agricultural production, thus pulling down the
overall rate of growth for the Third Five-Year Plan and for A
recovery in agricultural output brought a sharp rise in national income in the
following year, followed by moderate though sustained rates of growth until a6 INTRODUCTION
TABLE1-1











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1950—Si 90.9 253.1 68.4 82.7
1951—52 93.1 255.1 70.1 83.4
1952—53 96.4 259.1 72.6 84.7
1953—54 102.6 270.8 3.7 1.8 77.3 88.5
1954—55 105.3 272.9 79.3 89.2
1955—56 108.9 277.1 82.0 90.2
1956—57 115.1 286.9 86.7 93.8
1957—58 113.2 276.9 85.2 90.5
1958—59 122.3 292.6 4.0 2.0 92.1 95.6
1959—60 124.5 292.2 93.7 95.5
1960—61 132.8 306.0 100.0 100.0
1961—62 137.3 309.3 103.4 101.1
1962—63 139.9 308.2 105.4 100.7
1963—64 147.7 318.3 2.6 0.4 111.2 104.0
1964—65 158.8 335.1 119.6 109.5
1965—66 150.8 310.9 113.5 101.6
1966—67 152.3 307.9 1.0 —1.0 114.7 100.6
1967—68 166.1 328.2 9.0 6.9 125.0 107.3
1968—69 171.5 331.1 3.3 0.7 129.2 108.2
1969—70 180.9 341.9 5.5 3.8 136.2 111.7
1970—71 188.6 348.6 4.3 2.0 142.0 113.9
1971—72 191.7 346.0 1.7 —0.7 144.4 113.1
1972—73 188.5 333.0 —1.7 —3.8 141.9 108.8
SouRcEs: For the period 1950—51 to 1959—60, unpublished material made available
to the authors. For 1960—61 to 1972—73, Economic Survey, Government of India,
1973—74.AN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 7
new pronounced slowdown came with still another fall in agricultural produc-
tfonin 1971—72 and 1972—73.
POPULATIONAND PER CAPITA INCOME
The growth of per capita income, as shown in Table 1—1, has been less
than the growth of national income because population has grown. And the
growth rate of population, as is clear from Table 1—2, has accelerated in the
I 960s from its 1 950s level. The percentage of urban population has marginally
increased from 16 percent in 1951 to 18 percent in 1961 and presumably to












1931 279 33 12 246
1.34 2.6 1.1
1941 319 44 14 275
1.25 35a 1.0
1951 361 58a 16 303
1.98 3.1 1.7
1961 439 79 18 360
2.25 3.3 2.1
1971b 547 109c 20 439
SOURCE: Basic Statistics Relating to the India.n Economy: 1950—51 to 1970—71,
Government of India, Planning Commission, Statistics and Surveys Division, New Delhi.
a. The originally reported figure for urban population in 1951 was 62.4 million and
this is the figure used here in calculating the percentage increase from 1941 to 1951. The
1951 figure, however, was subsequently adjusted downward when the1961 census
adopted a more rigorous definition of urban population. Figures for the earlier years have
not been adjusted.
b. As of April 1.
c. Urban population for 1971 is estimated on the assumption of a further increase
of 2 percentage points from 1961 in share of total population.8 INTRODUCTION
DOMESTIC SAVINGS
While the growth of national income, both absolute and on a per capita
basis, has been modest, performance on the criterion of domestic savings effort
was satisfactory during the period of the first three five-year plans (though the
steady increase in the rate of saving has not been sustained since 1966, as we
shall also see in Chapter 16).
Thus Table 1—3 shows that the savings rate, as a percent of NNP, went
up from an average of 6.28 during 1950—52 to an average of 11.14 during
TABLE 1-3































SOURCE: Estimates of National Product, 1948-49 to 1962—63 and Estimates of
National Product, Saving and Capital Formation, 1960—61 to 1971—72, Government of
India, Department of Statistics, Central Statistical Organization, NewDelhi.
a.The post-1960—61 NNP figures are the revised series and the pre-1960—61 figures
are the conventional series.AN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 9
1964—66. A role in this improvement was played by tax policy: tax revenue
as a percent of NNP also went up from less than 7 percent at the beginning
of the period to more than 14 percent at the end of it. The contribution of the
public sector to domestic savings has, however, not been fully commensurate
wath this tax effort, as official current expenditures have risen more rapidly
than governmental savings. Indeed, the public sector contribution to the
domestic savings effort seems to have reached a peak of 29.3 percent (Table
1--4) by 1964—65 and then declined later rather steeply, though the data on this
phenomenon are rather tentative.
EXTERNAL RESOURCES
The inflow of external assistance to India has been low per capita, ranking
virtually at the bottom of the list of aid recipients.4 By the criterion of aid
in relation to GNP, India has fared a little better, for the simple reason that
her per capita income is also at the tail end of the world distribution.
The data on external assistance to India as a percent of national income
are given in Table 1—5. They underline the relatively small share of foreign
aid in India's developmental effort; they also bring out clearly the abrupt fall
in the role of foreign aid in her efforts since the peak reached in the mid-
1 960s.5 While Table 1—5 shows aid utilizations, which differ from aid authori-
zations for well-known reasons, the conclusions we infer from it are sustained
by the data on authorizations as well.
The role of private foreign investment in India ha.s been even less im-
portant, given (1) the unwillingness of the Indian government to invite foreign
investment uncritically, (2) the fact that the economy is so large that only a dra-
matic influx could possibly make the inflow large relative to national income,
and (3) the outflow of capital from the older industries, principally tea.6
Rather than burden the reader with detailed numbers, it should be enough
to illustrate the rather small role of private foreign investment in Indian de-
velopment by citing the figures for 1964—65. For this year, the gross inflow
portfolio plus direct investment into India was only about Rs. 1.02 billion,
or slightly over .6 percent of the (conventional) NNP estimate for the year.
And the net inflow, at Rs. 818 million was only a little over 0.5 percent of
NNP.7 Compared with the aid estimates in Table 1—5, the private inflow of all
long-term capital was only about a seventh. The major investors on a country-
of-origin basis were the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, in that
order, although the outstanding stock of private long-term capital was largely
in British hands and has continued to be, given the heavy British investment in
India before independence, the comparatively small inflow of private capital
since, and the large British share in this inflow anyway. It should also be of
some interest to note that, as of March 1967, the estimated distribution of pri-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































percent; services, 23.9 percent; petroleum, 16.8 percent; plantations, 11.4 per-
cent; and mining, 0.9 percent.8
PRICELEVEL
TheIndian economy has also been somewhat atypical, during 1950—1966,
in that its price increases have been moderate over the period as a whole. This
is clearly evident in the wholesale price index in Table 1—6, which shows the
1965—66 price index at 147.0 with base 1950—51, indicating a simple annual
rate of increase of only 3 percent.9
On the other hand, this remarkable stability began to disappear after
1962—63. The rise in defense expenditure following the Sino-Indian border war
of 1962 and the two serious agricultural droughts during 1965—66 and 1966—67
had much to do with this; and the subsequent moderation of the price increases
to trend level during a recessionary period has again given way to serious price
rises since 1972—73, reflecting partly the refugee and defense burdens arising
from the Bangladesh crisis and also another bad harvest which afflicted the
Indian economy (as well as the Soviet and the Chinese economies) during
1972—7 310
PRODUCTIONSTRUCTURE
The importance of agricultural production in explaining the post-de-
valuationperformance of exports and the price level is intuitively seen also by
noting at this stage that agriculture has continued to play an important role in
the production structure of the economy during the entire period of our study.
Thus Table 1—7 shows that agriculture and allied activities continued during
the 1960s to provide approximately half of net domestic product measured
in current prices. On this basis there would seem to have been no significant
declinein the role of agriculture in the Indian economy. This result is partly
attributable, however, to the greater increase in agricultural prices than in
those of other sectors. At constant (1960—61) prices the shares in NDP in
1969—70were 43.7 percent for agriculture and allied activities, 22.9 percent
for industry, 15.9 percent for trade and transport and 17.5 percent for services.
AGRICULTURALPRODUCTION
We may further note that according to the 1971 census, nearly 70 percent
ofthe workers were employed in agriculture. Agriculture is the dominant sup-
plier of wage goods and raw materials for the production of wage goods. It
alsoaccounts for more than a third of India's exports.
It is thus of importance for the reader to keep in view the major aspects
ofIndia's agricultural performance during the period of our study. In particu-
lar, it should be noted that, from the viewpoint of production trends, the period
through1964—65 must be distinguished from the subsequent period for twoAN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 13
TABLE 1-6







—(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1950—51100.0 100.0 100.0 — — — —
1951—52 96.7 115.5 105.5 — — — —
1952—53 88.9 96.8 89.4 — — — —
1953—54 94.8 95.8 93.6 — — —
1954—55 84.1 97.4 87.0 — — —
1955—56 77.0 96.5 82.7 — —
1956—57 90.9 102.9 94.2 — — —
1957—58 94.6 104.6 97.0 — — — —
1958—59102.4 104.9 101.0 — — — —
1959—60105.8 108.1 104.7 — — — —
1960—61106.7 119.9 111.7 — — —
1961—62106.8 122.6 111.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1962—63112.1 124.7 114.4 102.3 106.5 102.6 103.8
1963—64121.6 126.9 121.0 108.4 115.4 104.8 110.2
1964—65142.1 132.9 136.6 130.9 135.4 109.0 122.3
1965—66150.0 144.4 147.0 141.7 144.6 118.1 131.6
1966—67177.7 157.8 171.1 166.6 171.1 127.5 149.9
1967—68215.3 160.2 190.2 188.2 207.8 131.1 167.3
1968—69205.6 163.2 188.0 179.4 196.9 134.4 165.4
1969—70 — — — 194.8 196.8 143.5 171.6
1970—71 — — — 201.0 203.9 154.9 181.2
NOTE: The blanks represent unavailable estimates.
SOURCES: Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy, 1950—51 to 1968—69,
Government of India, Planning Commission, Statistics and Surveys Division, New Delhi.
Economic Survey: 1970—71, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reasons that critically affect the latter:(1) new technology—the so-called
"Green Revolution" based on new varieties of foodgrains—began to spread from
1965—66 on; and (2) there were two unprecedented droughts in 1965—66 and
1966—67. The consequences of the droughts clearly dominate the effect of the
Green Revolution so that the annual compound (semi-log trend) growth rate
of agricultural output is 3.2 percent for 1949—50 to 1964—65 but falls drasti-
cally if we include the two drought years. It should be noted, however, that
even when we exclude those years and extend the period to 1969—70, the
annual compound growth rate is slightly lower at 2.9 percent, though the de-
cline is imperceptible (from 3.0 to 2.9 percent) in the case of foodgrains (to
which the Green Revolution is really relevant)." Thus the Green Revolution,
at best, seems to have arrested a possible decline in foodgrain production but
has not been effective in eliminating a slight decline in the overall trend growth
rate in agricultural production.
We may also note that this growth rate has been the result of both area
extension and growing yield per hectare, the two factors contributing in equal
measure to the growth rate of total production. Moreover, the aggregate picture
conceals divergent performances by different commodities. The new technology
had its impact primarily on wheat. The estimated rate of growth of wheat
production was thus 4 percent per annum during 1949—50 to 1964—65 but
increases to 5.1 percent when the period is extended to 1969—70. The contri-
bution of yield growth was 1.3 percent per annum in the former period but
turns out to be 2.4 percent per annum over the longer period. Thus the new
technology has accelerated the growth of yield per hectare and hence that of
total output of wheat.
SHIFTING STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Two things are notable about the performance of the industrial sector
during the period of our study. First, the growth rate of this sector exceeded
that of the agricultural sector and also accelerated through the three five-year
plans. The index number of industrial production (Table 1—8) shows a com-
pound, annual rate of growth of 5.75 percent in the First Plan, nearly 7.5
percent in the Second and close to 8 percent in the Third. The post-1966
performance has been less satisfactory because of the industrial recessionwhich
set in during 1966—67 and continued through 1969—70. This phenomenon is
analyzed at length in connection with the June 1966 devaluation discussed in
Chapter 8.12
Second, the structure of industrial production has gradually shifted away
from a preponderant role for consumer goods production to a growing role for
capital goods and intermediates. During 195 1—63, for example, the relative
shares in terms of gross value added, gross output at• factor cost and gross
output at market price, declined steadily for consumer goods, rose steadilyAN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 17
TABLE 1-8




































































































NOTE: The weights shown apply to the series starting with 1960. Index numbers
by end-use categories are not available for earlier years. The overall index shown above
for years prior to 1960 (originally based on 1951 as 100) has been linked to the new
index, based on 1960, in that year.
SouRcEs: Reserve Bankof indiaBulletin, November 1960, June 1961, June 1970,
December 1972 and December 1973.18 INTRODUCTION
for capital goods and remained steady at around 35 to 40 percent for inter-
mediates and raw materials.'3 Furthermore, by using alternative measures of
import substitution and by carefully distinguishing among them, Padma Desai
has shown that all measures underline the following conclusions: (1) for the
period 1951—63, import substitution in the capital goods sector predominates;
(2) the First Plan, however, was characterized by relatively substantial import
substitution in the consumer goods sector; and (3) the Second Plan, with its
emphasis on investment in heavy industries, registered the lowest import substi-
tution in the consumer goods sector and the highest in the capital goods
sector.'4 These conclusions must carry over into the Third Plan as well, as is
evident if one examines the industrial production index during 1961—66: with
1960 =100,it stands at 244.2 for capital goods industries, 140.1 for inter-
mediate goods industries and 127.5 for consumer goods industries for
FOREIGN TRADE
We will have occasion later to analyze the foreign trade sector inten-
sively. Here, in this broad overview of the Indian economy, we confine our-
selves to a very general and brief description of the major features of India's
trade performance and policies.
Import Licensing.Throughout the period under study, imports have
been licensed. The proportion of licenses going to traders (the Established
Importer licenses) has steadily diminished (from over 61 percent of all licenses
issued in 1951—52 to less than 3 percent in 1970—71) and the proportion
going directly to producers (the Actual User licenses for intermediates and the
Capital Goods licenses for equipment) has now taken over the bulk (more
than half) of available imports. The licensing has further been characterized
by numerous restrictions on import specification, transferability and "indige-
nous clearance" to protect domestic suppliers of import-substitutes. Finally,
the licensing has varied in degrees of restrictiveness. It was rather light during
the First Plan, intensely severe during the Second, somewhat less so during
the Third (except in the last two years), and perhaps equally so since then.
It may be noted that import licensing has been operated, virtually throughout
the period since the Second Plan, in conjunction with industrial licensing over
much of the Organized Industrial Sector.
Exports.India has not merely a rather low ratio of exports to national
income;'6 her share in total world trade has also been falling through the
period of our study, as Table 1—9 highlights, and is now less than one-third as
large as it was in the years immediately following World War The compo-
sition of Indian exports has remained heavily biased toward "traditional" items
such as tea, jute manufactures and cotton fabrics, these three items alone
accounting for a quarter of India's export earnings as late as 1970—71. But
new, "non-traditional" exports such as engineering goods, chemicals and allied
products have grown in the 1960s to over 10 percent of India's total exports.'8AN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 19
TABLE 1-9
India's Exports and Share of Total Value of World Exports, 1948—70
Calendar World Exports Indian Exports
Indian Exports as
Percentage of
Year (U.S. $ millions) (U.S. $ millions)World Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1948 53,300 1,363 2.6
1949 53,900 1,309 2.4
1950 55,200 1,146 2.1
1951 74,800 1,611 2.2
1952 72,400 1,295 1.8
1953 73,400 1,116 1.5
1954 76,400 1,182 1.5
1955 83,200 1,276 1.5
1956 92,600 1,300 1.4
1957 99,300 1,379 1.4
1958 94,800 1,221 1.3
1959 100,600 1,308 1.4
1960 113,400 1,331 1.2
1961 118,600 1,387 1.2
1962 124,700 1,403 1.1
1963 136,000 1,631 1.2
1964 152,600 1,749 1.2
1965 165,400 1,686 1.0
1966 181,400 1,606 0.89
1967 191,200 1,612 0.84
1968 213,700 1,760 0.82
1969 244,900 1,835 0.75
1970 280,500 2,026 0.72
SOURCES: International Financial Statistics, Supplement to 1966—67 issues, March
1968, October 1973, International Monetary Fund.
Imports.The structure of imports has been shifted almost exclusively
toward capital goods, intermediates and raw materials, the only consumer
goods imported in any significant quantity being food.grains. Import licensing
has been used for this purpose; and the shift from El to AU and CG licensing
is also clearly linked to this phenomenon of the drastic decline of consumer
goods imports. Table 1—10 quantifies the picture as of 1966—67 to 1968—69:
the only consumer goods imports, other than food, come under the non-food20 INTRODUCTION
TABLE 1-10
Imports by Category, 1966—67 to 1968—69
(U.S. $ millions)
1967—68 1968—69
Fooda 868 691 449
Non-food 1,903 1,986 2,096
(1) Machinery and equipment 363 289 265
(2) Maintenance imports 1,393 1,508 1,612
(a) Components and spares 415 402 434
(b) Raw materials and intermediates
(excluding metals) 733 852 948
(c) Metals
(1) Ironand steel 131 142 115
(ii) Non-ferrous 114 119 119
(3) Others 146 191 218
Total imports 2,771 2,677 2,545
SOURCES: Government of India, Ministry of International Trade, Office of the Chief
Controllerof Imports, New Delhi.
InternationalFinancial Statistics, May1961,May 1971,December 1962, October
1967, November 1972, August 1973, International Monetary Fund.
a.Food here consists only of cereals and cereal preparations. A small amount of
food and edible products is included in item 3 (others).
item (3) and these clearly were at most 5 to 8 percent of total imports by the
late 1960s.19
Trade and Current Balance.In a OR-regime, the trade balance is of
little intrinsic significance while the potential deficit (which is suppressed) and
the resulting premia on imports are more important concepts. The Indian trade
balance has been constantly negative for the simple reason that external re-
sources have come in as aid and long-term investment and that the balance on
invisibles account is both relatively small and again negative. The trade deficit
has, in fact, been of the order of $700 to $1300 million, and the current
account deficit of the order of $750 to $1500 million during 1961—62 and
1967—68 but has declined thereafter (along with aid flows generally). Thus
during 1968—69, 1969—70 and 1970—71, the trade deficit was estimated at
$497, $238 and $424 million, respectively, and the current account deficit at
$676, $437 and $632 million, respectively.
Foreign Exchange Reserves.These estimates may be compared with
the foreign exchange reserves position portrayed in Table 1—11. Note that the
foreign exchange position became "thin" after the First Plan, the reserves
being virtually halved during 1957 when the balance of payments crisis eruptedAN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 21
with the onset of the Second Plan. The decline continued sporadically through
the late 1960s.2°
Key Institutional Features.
We now add a brief description of some of the basic institutional features
of India's economic and political structure. An understanding of these features
is essential if the reader is to put the analysis in this volume into proper
perspective.
INDUSTRIAL TARGETING AND LICENSING
Beginning with the Second Plan, the practice of setting industrial targets
became common, and subsequent plans have set out detailed targets for
capacityand production in the Organized Industrial Sector.
Inaddition, the system has been characterized by comprehensive indus-
trial licensing. Licensing has been wider in scope than targeting for the simple
reason that it has extended to finer product classification; it has also had to
contend with applications to create capacities in areas and in products that
were not anticipated in the plan documents. Except for exemptions granted
laterduring theperiod of our study, both in terms of theexemption limit on
sizeof investment and in terms of exemption by industrial classification of the
applicant, industrial licensing has been comprehensive.
The industrial licensing system has been operated alongside the import
licensing system in that any expansion of capacity or altogether new investment
has required both CG import licenses and industrial licenses through the bulk
of the period since industrial licensing began with the Second Plan. This
accounts for the important point, made later in this study, that the relaxation
of industrial licensing in the late 1960s did not manage to change the restric-
tiveness of the economic regime because import licensing did not change in
substance.
Industrial licensing has also been applied in an extremely detailed man-
ner in relation to its intended purpose. Thus augmentation of capacity by
marginal addition of equipment (even for the sake of achieving balance among
the various branches of a plant), product diversification and other such re-
sponses to changing market conditions that would be normal in an efficient
industrial environment have been constrained by the way industrial licensing
has functioned.2'
Itshouldalso be noted that a principal objective of the industrial licensing
system was to prevent further concentration of economic power in large con-
cerns. In practice, efforts to reach this objective were to be frustrated because
the smaller entrepreneurs generally could not invest as much in the aggregate,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































because it became clear that the bureaucratic system of administered alloca-
tions was as disproportionately accessible to larger business houses with their
connections and muscle as the market system was in view of their greater access
to finance. Ultimately, by the late 1960s, the government was to shift to a policy
under which the Large Industrial Houses, so designated, were to have their
investments confined to the so-called "core" (generally heavy) industries.
Under the same policy, a nationalized banking system was to encourage the
expansion of the small-scale sector and a Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission was to be set up to watch out for and check the expansion of
monopoly and concentration in Indian industry and to examine related issues.
As we shall see, none of these changes, which were designed to permit and
prompt the expansion of the Large Industrial Houses in approved (core)
sectors, so as not to hinder the task of expanding overall investment in the
economy, were really successful and for this reason, among others, industrial
investments were to be slack in the late 1960s.
PUBLIC SECTOR
Among the most important institutional features of the Indian economy
are the large share and continuing expansion of the public sector in overall, as
in industrial, investments. This phenomenon is of particular importance as the
impact of trade and exchange rate policies on allocation and production deci-
sions within the public sector cannot be totally decisive: we should also take
into account the abilitythese investments to survive the market test owing
to implicit subsidies (as when the public sector enterprises do not have to show
"normal" profits). In practice, the difference between private and public sector
performance does not go particularly beyond this. The reason is simply that
the policy of automatic protection for domestic investments, whether public or
private, has served to make the market test of survival more or less irrelevant
for weeding out inefficient firms and industries; thus the additional impairment
of the market mechanism, implied by the public sector not having to turn in
"normal" profits, adds little of substance to this basic weakness of the Indian
economic regime.22
The share of the public sector in total Indian investment has been esti-
mated at over 46 percent for the First Plan, over 61 percent for the Second
and over 58 percent for the Third. The public sector's share in Organized
Industrial Sector investment has consistently run well over half of the total
during this period. Within the industrial sector, furthermore, the government
has invested significantly in heavy industry: steel, oil refineries, heavy electrical
and heavy engineering being the major areas. The distribution by sector of
cumulated investment in public sector projects during 1965—66 registered
40.62 percent for steel, 20.29 percent for engineering, 9.11 percent for chem-
icals, 12.22 percent for petroleum and 7.49 percent for mining and minerals. TheAN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 25
remaining 10.29 percent was accounted for by financial institutions, shipping,
aviation and miscellaneous activities.23 The government has also sought,
through two Industrial Policy Resolutions, to reserve certain "key" industrial
sectors for public sector investment (e.g., steel); but in practice these restric-
tions have been treated with some flexibility.
CONTROL OF INFLOW OF TECHNOLOGY AND INVESTMENT
We should next note the strict regulation of the inflow of technology and
investment by the government throughout the period of our study. The "techni-
cal collaboration agreements" between Indian entrepreneurs and foreign sellers
of technology have had to be approved and the royalty terms carefully screened
and sanctioned. At the same time, clearance has been required for all equity
investment, whether in joint ventures or in subsidiaries (which are generally
disapproved in favor of joint ventures). This clearance has involved not
merely the whole gamut of import and industrial licensing but also the addi-
tional restrictive criteria relating to royalty terms on associated technical
transfers and to areas of permissible investment. In this regard, the Indian
economy has again been characterized by more stringent restrictions on the
inflow of technology and investments than the economies of many other
developing countries seeking external capital •24
STATETRADING CORPORATION
The foreign trade of India is not exclusively in the private sector. This is
true not merely in the sense that there are public sector enterprises whose
current output is also being exported. It is rather that the State Trading Corpo-
ration, established in 1956, has come to handle a substantial volume of both im-
port and export trade. It directly engages in trade and also occasionally permits
I)rivate traders to effect deals, subject to the corporation's approval and corn-
mission, in commodities otherwise traded by the STC alone. By 1965, this
trade was about 5 percent of total Indian trade. Thus, the role of the STC is
not very significant; but it needs to be kept in view, especially as the STC has
been a vehicle for channeling lucrative imports of some scarce commodities
and also for subsidizing the exports of some other commodities through STC's
absorption of losses on export sales. Two other corporations, of relatively
minor importance, are the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (consti-
tuted in 1963) and the Metal Scrap Trade Corporation (constituted in 1964).
TRADE AGREEMENTS
India has not been averse to conducting trade under bilateral trading
agreements, not merely with the Soviet bloc but also with other developing
countnes. Trade with the Soviet bloc in particular has steadily increased.
Thus, exports to the bloc were about 5 percent of total Indian exports during26 INTRODUCTION
the Second Plan but grew to nearly 16 percent during the Third Plan and have
steadily increased since. Nonetheless, the overwhelming bulk of Indian trade
continues outside the Soviet bloc and outside the framework of bilateral agree-
ments. Moreover, it is well known that both India and her trading partners
conduct bilateral trade with keen attention to international prices, so that such
trade presents no serious complication to the present analysis (nor do the
operations of the State Trading Corporation discussed above)
POLITICALSTRUCTURE
Since independence in 1947, India has been a parliamentary democracy
and has enjoyed remarkable political stability. The government has witnessed
long periods of firmleadership,with only three Prime Ministers in more than
twenty-five years. The dominance of one party, the Congress party, through
the bulk of the period has also increased political stability. The only interrup-
tion in this unparalleled record of political equilibrium was the struggle that
broke out over the prime ministership when Mrs. Indira Gandhi succeeded
Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. This upheaval led to the eventual bifurcation of the
Congress party and the near-decimation of the faction that became the so-
called "old Congress" before the "new Congress" emerged under Mrs.
Gandhi's firm leadership.
The main thrust of the political leadership has been toward ideological
positions identified with that nebulous word, socialism. This has implied
attention to objectives such as the prevention of concentrated economic power
and land reform, objectives which have not been pursued with the keenness
that attends their affirmation in the country. The opposition parties have been
on both left and right, ranging from laissez-faire Swatantra and backward-
looking Jan Sangh to varying shades of revisionist and non-revisionist Com-
munist parties eternally splintering and bickering. None of them have man-
aged to pose a sustained and serious challenge to the ruling Congress party
whose economic and political philosophy is fairly étatist and centrist.
The country is federal, with the central government overseeing state gov-
ernments in as many as seventeen states.26 The Congress party has generally
managed to rule in the states as well, but not always and, in recent years, even
less often. But even when the Congress party has had extensive control of
the state governments, center-state frictions have not been reduced, for re-
gional pulls tend to cut across party identifications.
Internationally, the country has experienced continuing problems on its
borders with Pakistan and China. There have been three wars with Pakistan
and one with China, and the burden of defense expenditure has been esti-
mated at 3 percent of GNP since the 1962 war with China.AN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 27
PHASES: 1950—70
Having given the reader an overview of the important institutional features of
and the key economic-performance indicators for the Indian economy, we are
now in a position to delineate the different phases (as defined in Appendix A)
in the Indian foreign trade regime. And we propose to analyze the Indian
economy in terms of the periods defined by these phases, in contrast to the
customary analysis in terms of the five-year plans. The phases which we dis-
tinguish are identified in Figure 1—1, which also traces several of the major
economic variables relevant to the delineation of the phases.
1950—56 (Phase IV).
This period corresponds roughly to the period of the First Plan. It was
characterized by good harvests and hence a satisfactory agricultural expansion
of nearly 5 percent per year. The index of agricultural production (1949—50 =
100)went from 90.5 in 1950—51 to 120.8 in 1956--57 for foodgrains and
from 95.6 in 1950—5 1 to 124.3 in 1956—57 for all commodities. Indian exports
fell as a percentage of world exports, remaining relatively stagnant in absolute
value after the Korean War peak, and import demand balanced this off to
result in a roughly equilibrated exchange rate which put little pressure on the
QR-framework that had been inherited from the Second World War. The
foreign exchange reserve position thus remained comfortable and official
reserves remained close to $1.9 million through this period. There was no
evidence of high import premia, systematic allocations of imports and indus-
trial licenses and associated economic policies of the kind that were to spring
up in the next period.
In a predominant sense, therefore, we can characterize this period as cor-
responding to Phase IV of the Bhagwati-Krueger schema. The convertibility
was not total, the QR-regime was not fully absent and so Phase V, as defined,
was not really present. On the other hand, the QRs were not systematically
designed to adjust the international accounts and their scope was severely
limited: they were, almost literally, left over from the Second World War and
the machinery for administering them had not been dismantled.
1956—62 (Phase I).
By contrast, the period extending approximately from 1956 to 1962,
broadly synchronizing with the Second Five-Year Plan, was characterized by
the imposition of a OR-regime in the strong sense, provoked by a severe
balance of payments crisis in early 1957. This was also a period of a shift in
the investment pattern to manufacturing industry and to heavy industry asAN oVERVIEW: 1950—70 29
Clearly, the period is somewhat easily characterized as Phase I, in terms
of extensive and intensive emergence of the OR-regime as a method of adjust-
ing the international accounts. At the same time, it should be noted that,
coincident with the balance of payments rationale, the introduction of indus-
trial licensing and industrial targeting simultaneously implied a rationale for
the OR-regime which rested rather on the objective of selective industrializa-
tion, buttressed by OR-regime-generated, automatic protection—as we shall
shortly discuss in Part III.
1962—66 (Phase H).
On the foreign payments front, the situation described above was more
or less carried into the period 1962—66, with one sign:ificant exception which
classifies this period as Phase II: export subsidization. was begun in earnest
around 1962 and intensified through the period on a whole range of exports.
Reserve position continued to be "thin"; aid flows were stabilized up to
nearly 1964—65; QRs remained severe (the premia on imports, however, rose
to unprecedented levels around late 1965 and early 1966 with the suspension
of aid following the Indo-Pakistan War in late 1965); and export performance
registered a significant improvement (until 1965 when a major drought
affected the traditional exports adversely). Industrial l:icensing also continued
to be severe but, toward the end of the period, efforts were made to loosen
it up. Toward the end, the government also steadily deployed import duties to
mop up the import premia.
This period can be broadly characterized as one involving "partial liber-
alization" in view of the export subsidization and growing resort to import
duties (both of these policies involving therefore a growing, de factodevalua-
tion); we should also note the halting moves toward more liberal industrial
licensing procedures. These moves were to culminate in our "Liberalization
Episode": the June 1966 devaluation and the accompanying import liberaliza-
tion. We will thus characterize this period as Phase II.
1966—68 (Phase III).
With the 1966 devaluation and import liberalization (based on enlarged
aid flows), we can identify the beginning of a third phase. The devaluation
was also accompanied by an elimination of export subsidies and reduction of
import duties. As it turned out, this period was afflicted, by a second disastrous
harvest, resulting in price increases and an adverse impact on traditional
exports, and subsequently by an industrial recession. This liberalization epi-
sode, in consequence, was ill-starred for economic reasons. These difficulties
were further compounded by the acute political pressure brought by aid donors
for this change of policies—as we discuss in Chapter 10. Thus, for several30 INTRODUCTION
reasons explored in Part IV in depth, Phase III did not lead to a Phase IV of
yet further loosening up of the OR-regime and its attendant effects, but rather
to a relapse, by 1968—69, into Phase II.
1968—70 (Phase II).29
By1969—70, the liberalization appeared to have been largely reversed.
The import premium was back to 30 to 50 percent on the average, export
subsidies bad been reinstated and were up to high levels, industrial de-licensing
had amounted to little(especially because of continuing QRs), automatic
protection with QRs was still the order of the day, and the picture looked very
similar to (though marginally better than). that obtaining during 1962—65.
The system had not really moved into Phase IV effectively but had rather
relapsed into Phase II. In this sense, the liberalization episode had failed; it
had also failed politically for the reason that exogenous developments (e.g.,
price rises due to drought) plus foreign pressures had (erroneously) dis-
credited, in the political and public eye, such a liberalizing package and hence
diminished the likelihood of its being tried again.
The delineation of the (approximate) phases in the Indian economy, as
defined above, now enables us to proceed to the following analysis:
1. characterize the "anatomy of exchange control" for Phase I and Phase
II, the former and the latter periods being similar in their import regimes but
different in that exports were subsidized during the latter Phase; this is the
subject of our analysis in Part II;
2. analyze in Part III the "liberalization episode" of 1966—68, beginning
more or less with the June 1966 devaluation, determine the conditions that
governed its outcome and draw lessons therefrom; and
3. examine in Part IV the overall growth effects of the foreign trade
regime (broadly defined to include the exchange rate policy plus the frame-
work of domestic policies such as industrial licensing), to determine whether
the QR-regime contributed to India's rather unsatisfactory economic per-
formance or improved it.
NOTES
1. For a comprehensive analysis along these lines see Jagdish N. Bhagwati and
Padma Desai, India: Planningfor Industrialization (London:Oxford University Press,
1970). This study, commissioned by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, is part of a series on industry and trade in some developing countries edited
by Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice Scott.
2. For a detailed discussion of the economic theory and techniques underlying the
successive plans, consult J. Bhagwati and S. Chakravarti, "Contributions to Indian Eco-
nomic Analysis: A Survey," American Economic Review, Special Supplement, 1970.AN OVERVIEW: 1950—70 31
3.See Figure 1—1 for index numbers tracing the course of agricultural production
over the period since 1950—51.
4. See Bhagwati and Desai, India, p. 181, for documentation and details.
5. The issue of whether foreign aid helped retard the domestic savings effort will
be discussed in Chapter 16 where we reach the conclusion that there is little evidence
for such a view. Note also that in Table 1—5 aid is being converted into rupees at post-
devaluation prices from 1966—67.
6. For details, consult M. Kidron, Foreign Investment in India (London: Oxford
University Press, 1965).
7. These estimates are taken from the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, August 1969.
8. ibid. This original source provides further breakdowns by direct and portfolio
investments as well as by branches and "foreign controlled rupee companies."
9. For some of the caveats in interpreting this index, especially with regard to biases
downward when prices are moving up, see Bhagwati and Desai, India, p. 76.
10. Our analysis, however, will stop around 1971—72 for reasons stated in the
Preface.
11. These and other estimates in our discussion in this section are based on T. N.
Srinivasan, "The Green Revolution or the Wheat Revolution?" in Comparative Experi-
ence ofAgriculturalDevelopment in Developing Countries of South East Asia since
World War ii (Bombay: Thacker and Co. for the Indian Society of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, 1972). More details and analysis are given there.
12. The index of industrial production during 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969 was
153.8, 152.6, 151.4, 161.1 and 172.5, respectively, as estimated in mid-1972 and reported
in the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin.
13. For detailed analysis, see Padma Desai, Import Substitution in the Indian Econ-
omy (Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Jawahar Nagar, 1972). The data refer
to the Organized Industrial Sector which is defined to include all establishments except
those employing fewer than ten workers using power or fewer than twenty without power.
14. ibid. See also an original paper by the same author, "Alternative Measures of
Import Substitution," Oxford Economic Papers (November 1969), for a theoretical
analysis of the rationales that may underlie the different measures.
15. In view of excess capacity in various industries and the tendency to deny im-
ported inputs to consumer goods industries in times of abnormal foreign exchange
stringency, the relative expansion of consumer goods investments may seem slightly
understated if one tries to infer it from the relative expansion of consumer goods
production.
16. This ratio, for example, was 4.8 percent in 1960—61. By a Chenery-type regres-
sion technique, however, it can be argued that India's exports are no smaller than what
her size would indicate to be the "on-the-line" level. See J. Bliagwati and J. Cheh, "LDC
Exports: A Cross-Sectional Analysis," in international Economics and Development,
ed. Luis Eugenio de Marco (New York: Academic Press, 1972).
17. The interaction among external factors, domestic policies and export per-
forrnance will be examined in later parts of this study.
18. If we include fish, art silk fabrics and iron and steel exports as well, the share
rises to nearly 20 percent in 1970—71. The major traditional export commodities include
coir yarn and manufactures, tobacco, leather and leather martufactures, coffee, iron ore,
manganese ore and mica.
19. This shift of the import structure so that consumer goods imports are seriously
reduced is typical of the postwar trend in many LDCs. See 5. Bhagwati and C. Wibul-
swasdi, "A Statistical Analysis of Shifts in the Import Structure in LDCs," Bulletin of
the Oxford University Institute of Statistics 34 (May 1972).32 INTRODUCTION
20. The reserves had recovered by 1972 to nearly $1 billion. This period, however,
is beyond the scope of our study.
21. Some of these constrictive features were to be relaxed after 1965, as noted in
Chapter 4. For fuller details of the licensing system until that time, consult Bhagwati and
Desai, India, pp. 231—248.
22. While the additional impact on inefficiency in allocation may be marginal, the
same is not true of the impact on savings. Thus, the early hope of Indian economists that
growing public sector investments would generate public savings to support growing
investment in the economy has not been realized.
23. The information in this section comes from Annual Reports of the Working of
industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government, Government of
India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi.
24. We do not discuss in this volume the rationale of these restrictions and whether,
on balance, they helped or hurt the economy. Several works are now available on the
theme of technology and foreign investment in the Indian economy, both for the private
and for the public sectors: Bbagwati and Desai, India; Kidron, Foreign Investments;
V. N. Balasubramanyam, International Transfer of Technology to india (New York:
Praeger, 1972); Padma Desai, The Bokaro Steel Plant (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Co., 1972).
25. See Asha Datar, India's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe,
1953—1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); reviewed by Padma Desai
in Economic Journal (September 1973), pp. 976—979.
26. The number of states has increased over time owing to linguistic demands for
the bifurcation of existing states and for other parochial reasons of one kind or another.
In addition to the seventeen states in 1972—73, there were twelve "Union Territories"
during 1972.
27. We have already discussed the estimates of import substitution in these areas
during successive plan periods. See also Desai, Import Substitution.
28. We have indicated the main outlines of industrial licensing. For a more inten-
sive analysis, see Bhagwati and Desai, India, pp. 231—248.
29. Although our analysis stops in 1970 because of data lags, Phase II has continued
and indeed was intensified at least until 1973 by the economic stress of the events that
led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1972.